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BOOK REVIEWS.

IS CONSCIENCE AN EMOTION? Three Lectures on Recent Ethical Theories. By Hastings Rashdall. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1914. Pp. x, 200. \$1.00.

This book consists of three lectures delivered upon the Raymond F. West Foundation at the Leland Stanford Junior University in 1913. The lecturer is undoubtedly the ablest living representative of rationalism in ethics. More than this, his various writings form one of the most persuasive presentations of the position of his school that have yet appeared. Whatever he writes is therefore sure to be worthy of careful examination. The present series of addresses is no exception to this rule.

The characteristic features of Dr. Rashdall's rationalism are probably known to those sufficiently interested in ethics to read this notice. Following the lines laid down by Sidgwick, though with certain modifications of his own, he recognizes the existence of two axioms—in his earlier writings split up into three—as lying at the foundation of the distribution of goods. They are: "One man's good is of equal intrinsic value with the like good of any other," and "The greater good (whether of self or another) ought to be preferred to the less." Unlike Sidgwick he asserts, in addition, the existence of *a priori* judgments revealing an objective scale of qualitative differences between goods; though he admits—as well he might—that the existence of such judgments is more difficult to demonstrate than the simpler axioms of quantity.

The content of the book before us consists of a defence of ethical rationalism and a criticism of certain of its opponents, notably, in the first lecture, Hutcheson and Humie, in the second Westermarck and McDougall (in the course of an examination of primitive morality), and in the third James as the author of *The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life*. The arguments urged against these particular writers as such are new, except as they have appeared in the author's recently published little manual, *Ethics*; but of course they are based on principles which were presented at length in *The Theory of Good and Evil*. The positive arguments for rationalism are in part the old ones, but

there are some significant differences between the earlier and the later book. Perhaps they are due to the exigencies of advocacy through the instrumentality of popular addresses. But whatever the cause, the fact remains that far less is made of intuitions of quality in goods and far more of the axioms of equity and benevolence. In *The Theory of Good and Evil* the latter are regarded as merely particular applications to ethics of the mathematical axioms, and not, properly speaking, as moral axioms at all; while in the present book the most elaborate argument for rationalism is based precisely upon these axioms. The author points out that our moral judgments have two characteristics which differentiate them absolutely from such experiences as the liking or the dislike for mustard. One is impartiality, or as we might perhaps call it, impersonality. What is right for one is right for every one else under the same conditions, whether or not I myself, my best loved child, a complete stranger, a bitter enemy, or some one who died three thousand years ago is one or the other of the parties concerned. The second characteristic is consistency. When two moral judgments are recognized as inconsistent, we recognize at the same time that at least one of them must be modified or abandoned. David sees that it cannot be right for him to take Uriah's wife, if it is wrong for the rich man to seize the poor man's lamb. These patent facts, it must be admitted, are ignored wholly or largely by most representatives of the emotional school. Westermarck, who has too much of a grip upon the moral experience in its concrete manifestations to be capable of such blindness, does indeed note their existence, but only in a timid, half-hearted way. Ignored or acknowledged, however, they are fundamental in any proper conception of the moral judgment. Accordingly Dr. Rashdall's challenge to find a place for them in any other than a rationalistic system is one that his opponents are bound to meet.

The present reviewer is one of those who believe that this challenge can be met, though he does not consider this notice a proper place in which to argue the matter. It must suffice to point out that besides emotionalism (if that term must be used) and rationalism there is a third ethical theory which our author nowhere explicitly considers but for which he has so much regard that he annexes its representatives in a body to his own school. How far he is justified in so doing will appear from a glance at a few of the names, Green, the two Cairds, Bosanquet, Mackenzie, Vol. XXV.—No. 4.

Royce. The fact of the matter is that these men are as far from pure rationalism as they are from pure emotionalism. It is the distinction of Hegel to have seen that there is such a thing as a logic of desire (or, if you prefer, of emotion), and that the moral *judgment* (and not merely moral conduct, as Kant would have it) gets its character through the action of reason on desire. Hegel's acquaintance with the facts of the moral experience was too incomplete and too imperfect to enable him to accomplish much in the use of this principle. In its application to the details of the moral life, the theory has not been worked out, since its first presentation, as it should have been. Nevertheless it has able supporters, as the above names show; and Mr. Hobhouse's extensive treatise, *Morals in Evolution* (which Dr. Rashdall refers to with the greatest respect) is nothing more nor less than a systematic attempt to apply it to the concrete facts of the evolving mind. No defence of rationalism is complete which does not come to terms with this view. Indeed no criticism of emotionalism is valid which does not recognize the existence of this factor in the system of the leading members of the eighteenth century "Moral Sense" school. For everyone knows that the emotions of adults, pathological cases apart, are always aroused by ideas, represent an attitude toward a conceived situation. Therein is at least implicitly recognized the possibility of applying the terms impartiality and consistency in reference to them. Inconsistency, for example, means in part, feeling differently about the same. Shaftesbury and Hutcheson knew this, though they did not apprehend its full significance; Hume recognized it in his own way, too (see, among other things, his essay entitled *A Dialogue*). The fundamental defect of Dr. Rashdall's valuable defence of rationalism is that he has ignored the possibility that this view may be capable of being just to the permanent elements in rationalism, while at the same time enabling us to explain the equally indubitable facts upon which emotionalism insists, but which its historic opponent either persistently ignores or treats in an extremely arbitrary way.

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